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INTRODUCTION 
In America’s earliest days, punishment for being poor extended 
beyond poverty’s unpleasant, concomitant circumstances—nagging 
hunger, tattered clothing, vagrancy—to include community-inflicted 
sentences such as banishment, whippings, and auctioning off the poor 
like slaves.1 American attitudes towards the impoverished may have 
transitioned from this uncivilized state of affairs, but resentment 
towards the poor continues to fester.2 Free choice, personal 
responsibility, and privilege are constant elements in an increasingly 
polarized national discourse on the appropriate balance between 
human compassion and accountability.3 
In the 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson transformed this 
debate by launching a national “war on poverty” and insisting that 
America provide education and opportunities to citizens of lower 
socioeconomic status.4 Expansion of welfare benefits through food 
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 1. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
WELFARE IN AMERICA 10, 20–21 (1986) (describing the degrading treatment the poor often 
faced in nineteenth-century America).  
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to Congress on the Economic Opportunity Act 
(1964), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS 224 
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stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) was 
a hallmark of the Johnson administration and provided considerable 
support to those below the poverty line. In the 1990s, however, 
welfare recipients’ alleged abuse of taxpayer dollars sparked a wave 
of criticism for the poor and fueled debates in Congress over welfare 
reform. By 1996, Congress had eliminated many entitlement 
programs, including AFDC, and replaced them with strict work 
requirements and time limits on benefits through Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”),5 ostensibly to increase 
personal responsibility.6 Although promoting self-sufficiency for able-
bodied welfare recipients is a reasonable aim, many scholars contend 
that the restrictions actually punish the impoverished more than they 
provide incentives for advancement,7 marking a shift in the balance 
between decency and personal responsibility. 
This tension between compassion and accountability mirrors a 
similar balance discussed in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
between enforcing standards of human decency and upholding 
legitimate punishment. Eighth Amendment doctrine has transformed 
over time to accommodate contemporary standards of human 
decency and to prohibit punishment that is offensive to society’s 
values, such as executing minors8 or the mentally impaired,9 or 
punishing the homeless for squatting in public when they lack 
adequate shelter.10 An unanswered question in Eighth Amendment 
scholarship is exactly where on these scales the denial of welfare 
benefits to the needy falls. This work seeks to fill that analytical void 
by analyzing Eighth Amendment doctrine and applying it to the 
welfare reform context, where new TANF restrictions penalize 
certain recipients by revoking benefits upon job loss11 and imposing 
 
(Gwendolyn Mink & Rickie Solinger eds., 2003) (“The war on poverty is not a struggle simply 
to support people, to make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give 
people a chance.”). 
 5. See infra Part I.B. 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 266–75 (2014) (explaining how TANF has punished the poor and 
caused significant strife within families that have lost invaluable benefits). 
 8. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that executing minors violates 
the Eighth Amendment). 
 9. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 521 (2002) (holding that it is a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment for states to execute the mentally impaired). 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
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harsh time limits on benefits.12 In the aggregate, this Comment 
contends that overly punitive welfare reforms represent 
unconstitutional punishment of a “status”13 rather than an action, 
offend contemporary notions of human dignity,14 and may, in fact, 
violate the Eighth Amendment. 
This Comment will proceed in three parts. Part I will explore 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and its historical underpinnings 
and will provide background on the 1996 welfare reforms. Part II will 
explore whether welfare reforms penalize individuals for their status 
as “poor” or “unemployed” and whether this constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment. Finally, Part III will show how welfare programs 
can be reformed for constitutional compliance. Overall, this 
Comment aims to show how the Eighth Amendment intersects with 
welfare reform and what constitutional limits exist vis-à-vis welfare 
restrictions for society’s neediest citizens. 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE 1996 WELFARE REFORMS 
American courts continue to analyze the Eighth Amendment in 
light of current standards of human dignity. Part A of this Section 
explores the evolution of Eighth Amendment doctrine, particularly as 
it relates to punishment for status crimes. Part B will examine welfare 
reform and its historical justifications to provide a framework for 
critically evaluating welfare restrictions in the latter portions of this 
piece. 
A. Historical Analysis of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Eighth Amendment specifically prohibits state15 and federal 
governments from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments on 
citizens.16 Originating in the English Declaration of Rights of 1688, 
the Amendment was incorporated into the U.S. Bill of Rights in 1791 
 
 12. See infra Part I.B.  
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
 15. See Justin F. Marceau, Criminal Law: Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: The Tension 
Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modern 
Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1287 (2008) (noting that, in 
its 1962 decision, Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
was selectively incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied against the states). 
 16. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 3. 
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to outlaw severe punishments offensive to human decency.17 
Historically, the Amendment was intended to forbid “torture and 
other barbarous methods” of punishment—such as disembowelment 
or decapitation18—that were used by states when imposing the death 
sentence.19 Early Supreme Court litigation focused on defining the 
outer bounds of permissible punishment and determining whether a 
particular method complied with the Eighth Amendment.20 
When the Court decided Weems v. United States21 in 1910, 
however, it recognized for the first time that proportionality was an 
important factor in Eighth Amendment analysis.22 Since this 
landmark case, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has 
come to serve three vital purposes: “it limits [the] kinds of 
punishment that can be imposed of those convicted of crimes, it 
proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 
crime, and it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal 
and punished as criminal.”23 In delineating the boundaries between 
constitutional and unconstitutional conduct in this realm, the 
Supreme Court relies upon evolving standards of decency, as 
reflected by society’s customs and values.24 More recently, the Court 
 
 17. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive Criminal 
Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (1966) [hereinafter The Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause]. Eighth Amendment doctrine has inevitably shifted over time as the meanings of 
morality, decency, and human rights have evolved. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803) (declaring that it is the Supreme Court’s duty to “say what the law is”). 
 18. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 17, at 637. 
 19. Jeffrey D. Bukowski, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the 
Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases is Not Beyond 
the Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 422 (1995).  
 20. Id.  
 21. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 22. Bukowski, supra note 19, at 423 n.28.  
 23. Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr., Construction and Application of Eighth Amendment's 
Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment—U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 78 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 
2 (2013) (summarizing and analyzing cases in which courts have interpreted the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause). 
 24. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 17, at 638. Although there is no 
precise legal standard for what suffices as “cruel and unusual,” Juliette Smith suggests a 
framework for invalidating laws under this Amendment based upon: “(1) the severity of the 
punishment and its degradation to human dignity, (2) the probability that the punishment would 
be inflicted arbitrarily, (3) substantial rejection of the punishment by contemporary society, and 
(4) the availability of a less severe punishment that would serve the same purpose.” See Juliette 
Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson 
Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 309 (1996) (citing to the reasoning in Justice 
Brennan’s concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281–82 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring)).  
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has taken judicial notice of international legal standards and jus 
cogens in evaluating the interaction of human rights and cruel and 
excessive punishment.25 
A series of Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions 
pertaining to drug addiction, homelessness, and welfare in the last 
fifty years have called into question the state’s ability to punish 
individuals based on their status. In 1962, in Robinson v. California,26 
the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that rendered it a crime to be 
“addicted to the use of narcotics.”27 According to the Court, the 
statute did not punish the act of using drugs, which would have been 
constitutionally permissible,28 but it punished the status of being a 
drug addict. The Court likened this to punishing someone for being 
mentally ill, for being a leper, or even for suffering from a simple 
cold—all statuses beyond the reach of criminal sanction.29 
A decade later, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,30 the 
Supreme Court found a Florida vagrancy statute unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it was overbroad, did not give residents proper 
notice regarding what conduct was impermissible, and placed too 
much discretion in the hands of police.31 With this level of discretion, 
“the poor and the unpopular [were] permitted to ‘stand on a public 
sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer.’”32 Sympathetic to 
the needs of the poor, and wary of the involuntary nature of poverty 
and homelessness, a federal district court in Florida similarly enjoined 
Miami officials from enforcing loitering statutes against the homeless 
when such persons engage in harmless conduct because “resisting the 
need to eat, sleep, or engage in other life-sustaining activities is 
impossible.”33 Arresting or punishing innocent, inoffensive conduct, 
 
 25. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (holding that the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and other human rights treaties and norms are relevant to the inquiry 
of whether the death penalty for minors should be prohibited as cruel and unusual in the United 
States). 
 26. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 27. Id. at 660. 
 28. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting 
public drunkenness on the grounds that the law banned a specific act rather than a status, and 
because the defendant was cited not for being an alcoholic, but for being drunk in public on the 
occasion in question). 
 29. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666–67. 
 30. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
 31. Id. at 165–71. 
 32. Id. at 170 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).  
 33. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
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such as sleeping in public when the homeless do not have shelter, 
violates the Eighth Amendment.34 
As the above cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts since the 1960s have begun to look askance at statutes 
that try to punish involuntary statuses or acts directly arising from 
poverty. Courts are cognizant of the fact that poverty and 
homelessness are usually not the products of free choice, but of 
unfortunate life circumstances.35 The Supreme Court has also utilized 
other constitutional provisions to invalidate laws that seem to target 
impoverished individuals. In Shapiro v. Thompson,36 for example, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a one-year waiting period before granting 
welfare benefits to someone changing residence from one state to 
another unconstitutionally infringed upon the individual’s right to 
travel and due process protections.37 The Court also ruled that a 
welfare agency may not terminate an individual’s benefits without 
first affording the recipient an evidentiary hearing in compliance with 
the Due Process Clause.38 Federal courts are often attuned to the 
 
 34. Id. In finding the police officers’ conduct in Pottinger v. City of Miami unconstitutional, 
the Florida court cited several other federal and state court decisions that had previously found 
criminalizing homelessness and its concomitant activities cruel and unusual because 
“punish[ing] the unfortunate for this circumstance [homelessness] debases society.” Parker v. 
Mun. Judge, 427 P.2d 642, 644 (Nev. 1967); see also Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2006), vacated on other grounds, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (preventing Los Angeles from 
arresting individuals for sitting, lying, or sleeping in public as a consequence of homelessness 
because doing so violates the Eighth Amendment, particularly when there are inadequate 
shelters available); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (“The 
evidence demonstrates that for a number of Dallas homeless at this time homelessness is 
involuntary and irremediable . . . . [T]hey must be in public. And it is also clear that they must 
sleep. Although sleeping is an act rather than a status, the status of being could clearly not be 
criminalized under Robinson.”); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), 
vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987, 987 (1971) (holding a vagrancy statute unconstitutional 
because it was vague, overbroad, and punished mere status); Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d 
368, 370 (Fla. 1965) (holding Miami’s disorderly conduct statue unconstitutional and expressing 
caution in enforcing vagrancy statutes generally); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201, 
207 (Mass. 1967) (explaining that “[i]dleness and poverty should not be treated as a criminal 
offence [sic]”). But see Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding a 
sleeping in public ordinance against First Amendment and equal protection challenges because 
sleeping is not per se a constitutionally protected activity). 
 35. See Smith, supra note 24, at 304–05 (discussing the “changing legal view of the poor”); 
see also Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137 (recognizing that “an individual may become homeless based on 
factors both within and beyond his immediate control, especially in consideration of the 
composition of the homeless as a group: the mentally ill, addicts, victims of domestic violence, 
the unemployed, and the unemployable”). 
 36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631, 642 (1969).  
 37. Id. at 631, 642. 
 38. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
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plight of the impoverished and readily accept greater constitutional 
protections for the poor as part of America’s aligning moral compass. 
Congress, however, has been more limited in granting aid to the poor 
since the mid-1990s, culminating in the elimination of AFDC and its 
replacement with TANF in 1996. 
B. From AFDC to TANF and the 1996 Congressional Welfare 
Reforms 
The modern welfare state can be traced back to the turn of the 
twentieth century, when many states supported young widows who 
had lost their husbands, often to industrial accidents. States created 
special “widows’ pension plans” designed to provide widows with the 
means necessary to care for their children so that they would not have 
to place them in orphanages.39 Economic strife and mass 
unemployment during the Great Depression generated the political 
will to expand these programs at the federal level and, accordingly, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act of 
1935, establishing federal widows pension benefits, social security, 
unemployment insurance, and AFDC.40 In the 1960s, President 
Johnson declared a “war on poverty,” expanding previous welfare 
programs like AFDC and initiating new programs such as the Federal 
Food Stamp program and educational plans like the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965.41 These initiatives were largely in 
response to the increasing awareness of racial inequality in the United 
States and its contribution to poverty.42 
By the late 1980s, however, many American taxpayers were 
increasingly dissatisfied with the federal welfare system, and Congress 
began launching campaigns for reform. Although some of the impetus 
for welfare reform likely originated out of a genuine desire to better 
 
 39. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, 
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 516–17 (2012) (explaining that the purpose of 
the Act was to give more resources, like textbooks, to underfunded schools so children in 
poverty could receive a better elementary and secondary education). 
 42. See generally Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to Congress on the Economic Opportunity 
Act (1964), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS, 
supra note 4, at 224 (“The young man or woman who grows up without a decent education, in a 
broken home, in a hostile environment, in ill health or in the face of racial injustice—that young 
man or woman is often trapped in a life of poverty.”). 
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incorporate lower-income citizens into the workforce,43 many people 
lamented the number of never-married, single mothers receiving 
welfare benefits and AFDC checks.44 Whereas most welfare recipients 
in the 1930s were widows with dependent children, by the 1990s, 
many individuals receiving AFDC benefits were single mothers who 
had never married.45 
The welfare reform debate revived a stark distinction between 
what some have called the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor.46 
Many political efforts aimed at limiting or prohibiting federal money 
from going to teenagers giving birth to children out of wedlock,47 
furthering the stereotype of the “welfare queen”48 and perpetuating 
the notion that some women “deliberately get pregnant and have 
babies in order to collect welfare and set up their own households.”49 
Moreover, the growing number of women balancing careers with 
childrearing by the late 1980s began fostering the expectation that 
women on welfare should work.50 
In this welfare-skeptical environment, Congress passed the 
Family Support Act of 1988,51 which established a mandatory federal 
jobs program and employment training.52 The most dramatic 
reform—the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 
 
 43. Hearings on the Work and Responsibility Act Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 
103d Cong. (1994) (statements of Donna Shalala), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS, supra note 4, at 578–86. 
 44. PREVIEW OF REPUBLICAN PLANS TO REFORM WELFARE (1994), reprinted in 
WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS, supra note 4, at 590–94. 
 45. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997). 
 46. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, America’s Uneasy Relationship With the Working 
Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 18 (1999) (describing society’s distinction between the “deserving” 
and the “undeserving” poor and how TANF requirements sought to limit benefits to those 
viewed as undeserving, including lazy, unmarried mothers who seek public assistance over 
work).  
 47. PREVIEW OF REPUBLICAN PLANS TO REFORM WELFARE, supra note 44, at 592. 
 48. Gilman, supra note 7, at 259 (highlighting President Reagan’s description of many 
single mothers on welfare as “Cadillac driving ‘welfare queens’” who cheat taxpayers out of 
their hard-earned money). 
 49. Issues in Brief: Teenage Pregnancy and the Welfare Reform Debate (Alan Guttmacher 
Institute 1995), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND 
POLITICS, supra note 4, at 624–30, 625. 
 50. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997). 
 51. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
667).  
 52. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997). 
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199653—was passed shortly afterwards and is still in place today. 
Under this legislation, TANF replaced AFDC, creating a new federal 
welfare scheme that eliminated “welfare entitlement.”54 States are 
now required to impose a five-year lifetime limit when federal funds 
are used to provide assistance to families, but states can also set more 
stringent limits on receipt of federal or state TANF benefits.55 States 
are also required to impose work requirements and to sanction 
individuals who are not working by revoking their benefits.56 Federal 
guidelines require that at least 50 percent of families within a state 
work at least thirty hours per week, or twenty hours for families with 
a single parent and children, and states can lose federal funding if 
they do not comply with this baseline.57 Generally, states cannot use 
federal funds to give additional benefits to women who give birth to 
children while receiving welfare benefits, capping the assistance 
provided based upon the number of children a single mother had 
prior to receiving TANF.58 Furthermore, states under the new 
legislation maintain substantial discretion to impose additional work 
or community service requirements, or time limits; or to require the 
use of TANF funds for childcare, job training, or similar services 
without providing direct cash assistance to families as they did under 
AFDC.59 
While the stated goals of TANF may be reasonable,60 many 
believe Congress intended the strict time limits and work 
requirements to punish the poor and decrease America’s 
responsibility for society’s neediest individuals and families,61 many of 
 
 53. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 
Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 20, 25 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 54. Under the new program, the federal government gives block grants to the states to be 
given to welfare recipients until funding evaporates for that fiscal year. RUTH SIDEL, KEEPING 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: AMERICA’S WAR ON THE POOR 105 (1998). 
 55. Liz Schott, Policy Basics: An Introduction to TANF, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=936.  
 56. Most of these sanctions are considered “‘full-family’ sanctions,” meaning that an entire 
family loses their benefits as a result of one adult member’s lack of employment. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. SIDEL, supra note 54, at 105. 
 59. Schott, supra note 55. 
 60. TANF’s stated goals are to provide assistance to needy families, promote work and 
marriage, decrease dependency and out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and encourage two-parent 
households. Id. 
 61. See SIDEL, supra note 54, at 109 (“In reality, the current wave of legislation is a way of 
punishing the poor for being poor, punishing mothers who are single—whether through 
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whom were branded as “undeserving” of taxpayer-funded cash 
assistance.62 Given that TANF has not been particularly successful in 
meeting its goals, but has instead eliminated a significant safety net 
for low-income households,63 TANF certainly seems to have done 
more to alienate and penalize the poor for their status64 than it has to 
provide them with vital assistance. 
II.  PENALIZING THE POOR: HOW WELFARE RESTRICTIONS CAN BE 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
This Section explores welfare reform in greater depth and 
explains how current restrictions could conflict with the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
especially when viewed in the light of contemporary standards of 
human decency. As certain reforms penalize individuals who are 
unemployed and place time limits on relief, these restrictions often 
surpass legitimate and constitutional guidelines for welfare. While not 
all limits on welfare are unconstitutional, some of the current rules 
may unconstitutionally penalize the mere status of being poor. 
A. Poverty and Unemployment as a Status 
Two dichotomous views of the poor constantly collide in 
American legal and social discourse and influence whether one 
perceives poverty as a consequence of free choices or more of an 
involuntary status like homelessness or drug addiction. The first 
deeply ingrained American model, originating in the Elizabethan 
Poor Laws in the 1600s, supports assisting the poor, but largely 
blames them for their own plight.65 Although English society aided its 
most destitute by providing shelter through “places of habitation,” 
the Elizabethan Poor Laws required all able-bodied males, single 
 
separation, divorce, death, or having children outside of marriage—for being single, and 
punishing those people who make us question the plausibility of the American Dream.”). 
 62. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Danilo Trisi and LaDonna Pavetti, TANF Weakening as a Safety Net for Poor 
Families, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3700 (showing that, on average, AFDC lifted 
62 percent of families out of deep poverty whereas TANF has only lifted 21 percent of families 
out of deep poverty). 
 64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 65. Larry Cata Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking Back 
Towards a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871, 953 
(1995). 
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females, and children to work a full twelve-hour day.66 Able-bodied 
individuals who failed to work were often placed in “houses of 
correction” and “[r]ogues, vagabonds, and vagrants were to be 
punished.”67 Under the common notions of the day, paupers were 
usually poor on account of their idle tendencies and this “failure to 
[work] was evidence of a social deviance significant enough to merit 
the attention of the civil and criminal law.”68 
The belief that many unemployed, able-bodied individuals are 
not only undeserving of public assistance but also are lazy, morally 
deficient, or repudiating the “Protestant Work Ethic”69—save a few 
carefully prescribed categories of individuals like widows and the 
temporarily unemployed—captures an important poverty paradigm in 
America. While debating the new TANF programs and requirements 
in the 1990s, several Congressional representatives and Senators 
spoke of welfare recipients with disdain and indecency, referring to 
some as “mules” or “wolves,” and with one Congressman even 
displaying a sign: “Don’t feed the alligators.”70 While an extreme 
example, these degrading insinuations reflect a common sentiment in 
American society that the impoverished, particularly the nonworking 
poor, are at fault for their poverty71 whether due to “laziness [and] 
lack of motivation”72 or moral depravity deriving from alcoholism, 
crime, promiscuity, or having children out of wedlock.73 Under this 
model, welfare is a generous gift from society’s honorable taxpayers 
and, as such, can easily be taken away at any time.74 On such a view, 
work requirements and time limits would be both appropriate and 
proportional. Such requirements would not punish welfare recipients 
for their status, but would prod the poorest members of society into 
joining the workforce and earning their own living. On this view, 
 
 66. Id. at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 959.  
 69. JOHN E. TROPMAN, DOES AMERICA HATE THE POOR? THE OTHER AMERICAN 
DILEMMA 19 (1998). 
 70. Gilman, supra note 7, at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. TROPMAN, supra note 69, at 33–34. 
 72. Id. at 34. 
 73. PREVIEW OF REPUBLICAN PLANS TO REFORM WELFARE, supra note 44, at 591.  
 74. Assuming, arguendo, that welfare could be taken away in its entirety, there are still 
constitutional limits on how it can be revoked once in place. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (holding that procedural due process requires a pre-termination hearing 
before revocation of welfare benefits can begin). 
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those who shy away from this laudable path should have to live with 
the consequences. 
In contrast to this model, another conception of destitution exists 
in America that acknowledges the involuntariness of poverty and the 
factors outside one’s control that can affect an individual’s income. 
According to a 2014 CNBC survey, a majority of Americans now 
believe that poverty is generally the result of circumstances beyond 
one’s control rather than a lack of drive or moral fiber.75 Factors 
including gender and race,76 lack of adequate educational 
opportunities,77 growing up in an unsanitary or crime-ridden 
environment,78 “the place or family” into which one is born,79 one’s 
mental and physical health,80 and other circumstances can prevent 
economic advancement, regardless of aspirations. According to this 
paradigm, many welfare recipients are “caring mother[s]” or 
“hardworking student[s],” even if they have struggled with drug 
addiction, out-of-wedlock pregnancies,81 or unemployment. For many 
Americans on welfare, they have “no hope, no other place to go, no 
other way to care for their children” and welfare provides an essential 
source of income that the recipients cannot supply on their own.82 
This model is less hospitable to rigid work requirements, 
responsibility forms, and time limits because it acknowledges that an 
individual’s status in poverty may be involuntary. 
As early as 1941, the Supreme Court recognized that “the 
Elizabethan [P]oor [L]aws no longer fit[] the facts” because “a person 
[] without employment and without funds [does not] constitute[] a 
moral pestilence . . . [as] [p]overty and morality are not 
 
 75. Steve Liesman, Being Poor Not a Person’s Fault: CNBC Survey, CNBC (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101524336. 
 76. TROPMAN, supra note 69, at 27. 
 77. See JONATHAN KOZOL, Chapter 1: Life on the Mississippi: East St. Louis, Illinois, in 
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 7–39 (1991) (describing the dearth 
of school resources and the lack of safe, clean educational facilities in East St. Louis, Illinois 
public schools). 
 78. Id. at 10–13. 
 79. Liesman, supra note 75. 
 80. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that courts have come to realize 
that factors such as mental illness and domestic violence are more to blame for poverty and 
homelessness than one’s moral makeup). 
 81. SIDEL, supra note 54, at 81–84. 
 82. Id. at 85. 
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synonymous.”83 Courts’ frequent invalidations of many of the 
ordinances banning sleeping in public, vagrancy, and loitering rest 
upon the theory that homelessness and poverty are not normally 
chosen conditions, but are circumstances that affect people in difficult 
financial straits.84 Although state and federal courts often stop short 
of fully embracing a constitutional “right to shelter,”85 judges 
frequently recognize the involuntariness of unemployment and 
homelessness and the way in which factors outside one’s control 
contribute to these phenomena. 
Therefore, viewing poverty and unemployment as more 
analogous to an involuntary status rather than a choice is appropriate 
in many situations and echoes the legal doctrine in this realm.86 
American children offer a prime example because they lack free 
choice over their circumstances and live in poverty in high numbers. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau statistics from 2012, 25.1 
percent of children under five live in poverty and 9.7 percent live in 
“extreme poverty,” or on a family income that is less than half of the 
poverty line.87 This income disparity disproportionately impacts 
children of color, particularly African-Americans and Hispanics.88 
TANF sanctions usually revoke benefits from an entire family when 
one adult member is failing to meet his or her work obligations, 
regardless of the impact these sanctions will have on the family’s 
children.89 As such, the mandated penalties in the federal guidelines 
are constitutionally suspect as they often force states to indirectly 
punish children through parental or family sanctions. 
 
 83. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174–77 (1941) (quotation marks omitted); see also 
Smith, supra note24, at 304–05 (describing the “changing legal view of the poor”). 
 84. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy, New Challenges and Directions for 
the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1231–34 (2003) (describing a few 1980s court decisions 
that recognized a right to shelter, but showing how more recent cases have lessened or 
eliminated this right). 
 86. This is not to say that these conditions could never be the products of free choice, but a 
recognition of the fact that they rarely are. 
 87. Valerie Strauss, New Census Data: Children Remain America’s Poorest Citizens, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/wp/2013/09/17/new-census-data-children-remain-americas-poorest-citizens.  
 88. Id. 
 89. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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B. Welfare Reform as “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment 
Assuming that poverty and unemployment are analogous to the 
aforementioned involuntary statuses of homelessness and drug 
addition,90 revoking welfare benefits from individuals and their 
families for losing their jobs, being fired, or being unable to maintain 
stable employment due to personal difficulties can be 
disproportionate and cruel.91 Many scholars and advocates agree that 
the 1996 Congress intentionally sought to punish certain sectors of 
poor Americans—those perceived as “hoarding” taxpayer dollars—
through this legislation. Wendell Primus, a former secretary at the 
Department of Health and Human Services under the Clinton 
Administration, resigned after President Clinton signed the 1996 Act 
because the “bill turned very punitive,” especially by limiting or 
denying federal funds to unwed minor mothers, instituting family 
caps, and limiting federal funds to families, all while the brunt of 
these new, restrictive policies would fall upon needy children.92 
What makes these restrictions potentially cruel and unusual is 
not only their inability to lift families out of poverty, but also their 
ironic tendency to disincentivize work, render the impoverished more 
destitute, and reverse AFDC progress.93 Many welfare recipients are 
severely restricted in their ability to find work or stay employed, 
facing such obstacles as “lack of education, mental or physical 
disabilities, substance abuse or alcoholism, limited work experience, 
and caregiving responsibilities for disabled children,”94 only a few of 
which are considered valid excuses for unemployment in most states 
under TANF.95 Unforeseen life circumstances that reduce work 
 
 90. This is not to say that idleness or criminality could not contribute to poverty or cause 
impoverishment for some segments of the population, but rather to say that the newer poverty 
paradigm holds that these are not sufficient explanations of poverty for a large majority of 
lower-income citizens. 
 91. Other provisions of the 1996 bill seem to be aimed at punishing the impoverished for 
their status as “poor,” “unemployed,” or “welfare recipients” based on outdated, Elizabethan 
notions that the nonworking impoverished should suffer the consequences of their choices. 
These provisions include lifetime caps, limiting money to single mothers, revoking benefits for 
legal immigrants, and restricting food stamps and social security income on the whole. 
WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Gilman, supra note 7, at 271. 
 94. Id. at 270. 
 95. See, e.g., Pam Silberman, North Carolina Programs Serving Young Children and their 
Families, N.C. INST. OF MED. 13 (1999) (explaining that the exemptions from work 
requirements in North Carolina are only applicable to single parents with children under one 
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potential can result in severe sanctions, such as partial loss of already 
meager benefits or even permanent revocation of benefits96—an 
unmistakable irony given that welfare’s purpose is to foster a “safety 
net” for struggling Americans.97 Although some states label caring for 
sick children as “community service” in order to satisfy the work 
requirement, other states are not as generous.98 Even if a state grants 
partial or complete community service credit to recipients caring for a 
sick relative, welfare generally has a five-year maximum lifetime 
limit.99 Given the rise of extreme poverty in the United States and the 
lack of eligible, needy families receiving benefits post-TANF,100 the 
program has arguably increased poverty rather than reduced it. 
Meanwhile, several Supreme Court and lower federal court 
decisions have recognized that depriving prisoners of vital necessities, 
such as shelter, food, or exercise, violates the Eighth Amendment.101 
In 2000, in Johnson v. Lewis,102 the Ninth Circuit declared that prison 
guards have an affirmative obligation to provide prisoners with life’s 
necessities, including food, water, and medical care, in compliance 
with the Eighth Amendment.103 Therefore, although the Eighth 
Amendment traditionally only applied to punishment for “crimes,” 
the prison deprivation cases show that sanctions and maltreatment 
 
year of age, un-emancipated minors, and adults with children under six years of age where 
adequate childcare cannot be found, whereas all other adults are deemed “mandatory work 
families”). 
 96. Yoanna X. Moisides, I Just Need Help . . . TANF, the Deficit Reduction Act, and the 
New “Work Eligible” Individual, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 17, 25 (2007). 
 97. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 285 (referring to the safety net as a “rhetorical illusion”). 
 98. See Moisides, supra note 96, at 29–30 (describing the situation of a Maryland woman, 
Hope, who fought in court to reinstate her benefits after the welfare office sought to close her 
case for being late to work or missing work while she was taking care of her ill son who suffered 
from asthma, diabetes, and respiratory infections). 
 99. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Peter Edelman, Welfare Reform and Extreme Poverty: What to Do?, 42 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 349, 350 (2008) (demonstrating that prior to welfare reform, the 
majority of children in extreme poverty benefitted from some cash assistance, whereas in 2006, 
less than one-third of families in extreme poverty were receiving TANF). 
 101. Bukowski, supra note 19, at 434; see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) 
(while holding that putting two prisoners in the same cell is not per se cruel and unusual 
punishment, “deprivation[] of basic human needs” or medical care can be unconstitutional). 
 102. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2000) 
 103. Id. at 731. Although the routine discomfort inherent in the prison setting is inadequate 
to satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment inquiry, “those deprivations denying the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an 
Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (internal citations 
omitted). Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, 
food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id. 
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can also rise to the level of “cruel and unusual punishment” if they 
are akin to “a fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by 
the authority of the law.”104 When comparing prison deprivation cases 
to welfare recipient sanctions, punishing individuals for 
unemployment in the context of welfare reform seems to violate the 
Eighth Amendment—especially when sanctions directly result in a 
similar denial of necessities. Critics of this view would argue that 
welfare sanctions are different from prison deprivation cases because 
welfare is more akin to charity and because welfare recipients are free 
to provide for their own needs in ways that prisoners cannot. 
There are grounded reasons, however, to more scrupulously 
compare the life situations of welfare recipients with that of prisoner 
confinement before dismissing the Eighth Amendment welfare claim. 
Extensive poverty research shows that most welfare recipients are 
plainly “trapped in the cycle of poverty”—the vast majority do not 
own cars, some lack simple furniture or even a bed on which to sleep, 
and most cannot procure vital necessities without welfare benefits.105 
Moreover, data shows that the number of families in extreme poverty 
continues to rise106 and that TANF can be blamed for an additional 
800,000 children in extreme poverty since 1995, children who would 
have been significantly better off under AFDC.107 Based on Justice 
Brennan’s “human dignity” metrics for cruel and unusual 
punishment108 and the reciprocal notion that prisoners are 
constitutionally entitled to life necessities, punitive welfare sanctions 
based on employment status or work capacity could equally violate 
the Eighth Amendment. 
If this understanding of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and 
TANF sanctions gained traction in the courts or Congress, it would 
have profound implications for America’s welfare system and how 
work requirements operate. Not all work or community service 
requirements would necessarily be prohibited under the Eighth 
 
 104. Bukowski, supra note 19, at 419–20, 429. 
 105. Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a 
Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1224–25, 1279 (2000). 
 106. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 107. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-164, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR 
NEEDY FAMILIES: FEWER ELIGIBLE FAMILIES HAVE RECEIVED CASH ASSISTANCE SINCE THE 
1990S, AND THE RECESSION’S IMPACT ON CASELOADS VARIES BY STATE 35 (2010). 
 108. See Smith, supra note 24, at 313–14 (quoting Justice Brennan’s “human dignity 
rationale” in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272–73 (1972): “the true significance of these 
punishments is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed 
with and discarded” (internal quotations omitted)).  
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Amendment, only highly punitive ones that seek to punish 
impoverished Americans for their status in poverty and deny 
recipients life-sustaining resources. Especially problematic would be 
work requirements for those who face life circumstances rendering it 
difficult if not impossible for them to work,109 and sanctions that 
deprive welfare recipients of vital resources, like food, water, and 
medical care.110 Sanctions that punish impoverished children for their 
parents’ “misdeeds” are particularly suspect, as are restrictions that 
terminate benefits for truly needy persons without just cause. 
C. Constitutional Challenges: Positive v. Negative Rights 
One glaring criticism of labeling welfare sanctions 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment centers upon the 
traditional distinction between positive and negative rights. Under 
traditional interpretations, the Constitution only protects its citizens 
from government intrusion, but it does not establish any “positive” 
rights or require the government to follow any particular course of 
action to ensure that rights are recognized.111 Thus, if welfare benefits 
are positive, statutory rights that are not per se constitutionally 
required, then revoking them cannot give rise to constitutional 
challenges because the Constitution only protects negative, not 
positive rights. 
There are two significant problems with this theory, however. 
First, the dichotomy between positive and negative rights has begun 
to crumble as many legal scholars have recognized that courts must 
enforce negative rights with positive rights; thus, scholars have argued 
that this deeply ingrained legal distinction is actually quite flawed.112 
A prisoner, for example, cannot be free from cruel and unusual 
 
 109. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 111. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COSTS OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES 40 (2000) (explaining the deeply held American dichotomy between 
positive and negative rights and providing that “[n]egative rights typically protect liberty; 
positive rights typically promote equality”). 
 112. See id. at 43 (explaining that “all legally enforced rights are . . . positive rights” or 
alternatively, “almost every right implies a correlative duty, and duties are taken seriously only 
when dereliction is punished by the public power drawing on the public purse”). But see Frank 
B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 866–67, 915–24 (2001) (suggesting 
a framework for distinguishing between positive and negative rights based on whether the right 
would affirmatively exist without any government at all and, subsequently, arguing that judges 
are not likely to give the poor a right to necessities because this is a role for the legislature, not 
the courts). 
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punishment unless prison staff members provide him or her with basic 
necessities. Likewise, a welfare recipient cannot be free from cruel 
and unusual welfare sanctions without receiving adequate benefits for 
his or her survival. Second, even if one accepts the traditional 
distinction between negative and positive rights and the premise that 
welfare is only a statutory right, revocable at Congress’s whim, the 
Supreme Court has still recognized constitutional limits on how 
welfare can be provided, revoked, and reinstated. Neither Congress 
nor the states can deny welfare benefits in a way that violates an 
individual’s freedom of association113 or freedom to travel,114 and 
welfare cannot be denied without a full and fair hearing.115 Likewise, 
welfare cannot be instituted or revoked in a way that violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
III.  A CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPLIANT WELFARE SCHEME 
There are a plethora of ways in which Congress could alter and 
revitalize the current welfare system to reflect evolving “standards of 
[human] decency.”116 Since Eighth Amendment doctrine reflects 
normative judgments about society’s current standards of decency, 
there is ample room for policy analysis within the jurisprudential 
framework. There are several viable alternatives to the current 
regime that would provide immediate relief to families and restore 
the safety net concept, both of which are essential to maintaining a 
healthy balance between personal responsibility and decency. 
Although encouraging able-bodied, healthy individuals and their 
families to become self-sufficient is a reasonable legislative goal, 
Congress should avoid withdrawing life-sustaining resources from 
citizens who depend on welfare for their survival. 
At a minimum, “full-family sanctions”117 should be eliminated 
and children in lower-income households should be independently 
entitled to welfare payments separate and apart from their parents to 
 
 113. See United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973) (holding that 
welfare agencies cannot deny eligible food stamp recipients for living with “unrelated persons” 
because this violates one’s right to association). 
 114. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641–42 (1969) (holding that welfare restrictions 
cannot inhibit one’s constitutional right to travel). 
 115. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–265 (1970) (requiring an evidentiary hearing 
before terminating a recipient’s welfare benefits). 
 116. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 17, at 638 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 117. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (internal quotations omitted). 
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avoid punishing children for their parents’ work histories. Although 
these checks could be sent to parents for the benefit of their children, 
they could also be given to individuals like Guardians Ad Litem,118 
who would ensure that children get access to the benefits, especially 
in situations in which parents are suspected of misappropriating the 
funds. Another improvement would be to eliminate the “one-size-fits-
all” benefits plan in favor of a case-by-case approach.119 Under this 
model, states would still need to provide a minimum level of benefits 
to needy families, preferably without time limits or lifetime caps.120 
While excessive state discretion could lead to abuse,121 a case-by-case 
approach may be useful in many circumstances—particularly in 
helping certain individuals to find jobs and in helping others to 
receive alcohol or drug treatment.122 
Although the current work requirements deeply impact poor 
families—often negatively—welfare should strive to lead recipients to 
stable employment and self-sufficiency when possible. Converting this 
system from its existing sanctions-based approach to an incentive-
driven scheme would likely lead to better results in improving the 
employment situations of welfare recipients and in eliminating 
poverty. Eligible individuals could receive minimum benefits to cover 
necessary expenses—such as shelter, nutritious food, and clothing—as 
well as additional benefits or “bonuses” for maintaining steady 
employment, participating in community service, elevating their job 
skills, or searching for work. These additional benefits could be held 
in trust for recipients until they become self-sufficient. These 
examples are certainly not exhaustive, but they provide a starting 
point for making welfare reform an adequate safety net that is 
compliant with the Eighth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The proliferation of hunger, malnutrition, unsanitary living 
conditions, inadequate heat and shelter, and denial of medical care in 
 
 118. Guardian ad litem programs have been successful in child abuse and custody cases, as 
these guardians represent a specific child’s interests in court. See generally Mary Kay Kisthardt, 
Working in the Best Interests of Children: Facilitating the Collaboration of Lawyers and Social 
Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing this point). 
 119. Gilman, supra note 7, at 277–78. 
 120. Edelman, supra note 100, at 354. 
 121. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 122. Id. 
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contemporary American society represents a failure of welfare 
reform to adequately uplift society’s neediest members. Sanctions 
placed upon unemployed TANF beneficiaries, limiting their ability to 
obtain vital resources, can hinder recipients’ advancement into the 
workforce and place many needy individuals, including children, in 
unsafe or unsanitary living conditions. The Eighth Amendment, 
however, has historically ensured that another population in need—
individuals in prison—has a constitutional right to adequate food, 
clothing, and shelter. Reconciling the distinction in treatment 
between these paradigms requires distinguishing between legitimate 
means of administering welfare to the poor, and the punitive, 
retaliatory measures that deprive them of life-sustaining resources in 
violation of the Constitution. 
